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Refusal of a subsidy for breach of the prohibition of cruelty to animals is not a penalty, later more favourable rules do not apply

In its judgment of 5 November 2026, Case No. 6 Afs 144/2026-32, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a cassation appeal brought by VÝROBA KRMIV spol. s r.o. in a dispute concerning a subsidy for vaccination in pig farming. The judgment addresses the nature of the refusal to grant a subsidy under Section 8(2) of Government Regulation No. 64/2023 Coll. and whether the principle of retrospective application of a more lenient law under Article 40(6) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms applies to such a refusal.

The State Agricultural Intervention Fund refused to grant the applicant the subsidy. It relied on Section 8(2) of Government Regulation No. 64/2023 Coll., as in force until 14 March 2026, under which a subsidy was not to be granted if the applicant had infringed Sections 2, 4 or 5 of the Animal Protection against Cruelty Act at any of its holdings. The applicant had been found guilty, by a final decision, of an administrative offence involving cruelty to animals in poultry farming and had been fined CZK 50,000. The Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s action.

At the heart of the dispute was an amendment introduced by Government Regulation No. 33/2026 Coll., which took effect on 15 March 2026. Under the amended provision, a breach of the prohibition of cruelty to animals is no longer sufficient, in itself, to justify refusing a subsidy. An additional requirement now applies: the breach must have resulted in a fine exceeding CZK 50,000. The appellant argued that the fine imposed on it did not exceed this threshold. It therefore sought to rely on the subsequent, more favourable legislation, arguing that the refusal to grant the subsidy was punitive in substance.

The Supreme Administrative Court rejected these arguments. It confirmed that both the administrative authorities and the Municipal Court had correctly applied the previous version of the legislation, in force until 14 March 2026. At the time of their respective decisions, the amended legislation had not yet been enacted. Moreover, the choice of the applicable version of the legislation was consistent with the amendment’s transitional provision, under which applications relating to 2024 were to be assessed in accordance with the previous rules.

The Court held that Article 40(6) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms was not applicable to the case. The administrative authorities had not initiated proceedings of their own motion to determine guilt and impose a penalty for an administrative offence; rather, they had conducted proceedings concerning an application for a subsidy. The refusal to grant the subsidy was an objective consequence of the applicant’s failure to satisfy the conditions laid down by law, rather than an individualised sanction. The Court had already reached the same conclusion in its judgments in Cases Nos. 6 As 253/2019-27 and 10 Afs 342/2022-73.

The Court also rejected the argument that the refusal was punitive in substance. The fact that a decision has financial consequences and may serve a deterrent purpose does not mean that it constitutes a determination of guilt and the imposition of a penalty. The executive is entitled to establish conditions governing the award of subsidies. An absolute requirement to comply with the prohibition of cruelty to animals is a legitimate condition for granting subsidies, pursuing the public interest in animal protection. Failure to comply with that requirement constitutes an objective bar to the award of a subsidy.

Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 5 November 2026, Case No. 6 Afs 144/2026-32, is available here.

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