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Failure to Confirm a Binding Opinion: An Action Against the Appellate Authority for Inaction

In its judgment of 5 November 2026, Case No. 4 As 114/2026-48, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed a judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague and dismissed as inadmissible an action for protection against unlawful interference brought by AVE CZ odpadové hospodářství s.r.o., the operator of the Čáslav Comprehensive Waste Management Centre. The judgment clarifies which type of judicial action may be brought, and against which authority, where a superior authority concerned fails to act in confirming or amending a binding opinion under Section 149(7) of the Administrative Procedure Code.

The case arose from appeal proceedings concerning the 28th amendment to the integrated permit for the Čáslav landfill. The appeals also challenged the content of a binding environmental impact assessment (EIA) opinion. Consequently, the Ministry of the Environment, acting as the appellate administrative authority, requested the Minister of the Environment, in his capacity as the superior authority concerned, to confirm or amend the opinion. However, the Minister failed to act within the 30-day time limit prescribed by Section 149(7). The claimant therefore brought an action for protection against unlawful interference, challenging the Minister’s failure to act. The Minister issued the binding opinion only after the judicial proceedings had commenced. The claimant subsequently sought solely a declaration that the interference had been unlawful. The Municipal Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the interference had not directly affected the claimant’s rights.

The central issue in the judgment concerns the nature of administrative inaction. The Supreme Administrative Court proceeded on the basis that appeal proceedings constitute a single set of proceedings, even though they comprise individual procedural steps undertaken by different authorities. The confirmation or amendment of a binding opinion under Section 149(7) is merely one such step. Accordingly, the primary interference with the right to have a matter dealt with without undue delay arises from the appellate authority’s failure to issue a decision on the appeal. Delays in individual procedural steps merely explain the reasons for that failure to act; they do not, in themselves, constitute unlawful interference.

The Supreme Administrative Court held that, under the fifth sentence of Section 149(7) of the Administrative Procedure Code, the time limit for issuing a decision on an appeal is suspended only for the period during which the superior authority concerned is required to issue its opinion (i.e. the statutory time limit laid down in the third and fourth sentences). Once that period expires without the opinion having been issued, the time limit for deciding the appeal resumes. This enables the party concerned to seek judicial protection by bringing an action against administrative inaction directed against the appellate authority.

According to the Court, the fact that the appellate authority has no coercive powers over the superior authority concerned (having only the possibility of requesting measures against inactivity under Section 80 of the Administrative Procedure Code), and that the issuance of the binding opinion cannot be directly compelled, does not justify fragmenting judicial protection. The superior authority concerned is bound by the principle of cooperation under Section 8(2) of the Administrative Procedure Code, while the State bears liability for damage caused by delays under the legislation governing State liability. An action against administrative inaction brought against the appellate authority seeks to secure the conclusion of the proceedings on the merits and provides sufficiently effective judicial protection, including through the enforcement of the court’s judgment.

In this judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court also resolved inconsistencies in the existing case law of the regional courts and departed from the previously published judgment of the Municipal Court, Case No. 15 A 44/2021-49 (No. 4269/2022 Coll. SAC), by which it was not bound.

The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 5 November 2026, Case No. 4 As 114/2026-48, is available here.

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